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Income, Endogenous Market Structure, and Innovation
Mei Lin∗, Shaojin Li†, Andrew B. Whinston‡
Abstract
We investigate the effect of income distribution on R&D in a dynamic framework.
Our model captures both the infinite R&D race among heterogeneous innovators and a
market where successful innovators generate revenues. The market structure of success-
ful innovations is endogenous–firms produce vertically differentiated substitute goods
and compete in price. Based on firms’ equilibrium market revenues, we derive nu-
merical solutions of the Markov perfect equilibrium innovation rate of the dynamic
problem. A key insight in our results is that explicitly modeling price competition and
the market structure plays an important role in evaluating the impact of rising income
inequality on R&D; furthermore, the way aggregate innovation responds to regulatory
policies might also depend on the market structure. Contrary to past findings, we
show that increasing income inequality has a negative effect on innovation when the
market quality gap is large, in which case, price competition leads to lower revenues
and diminishes the innovation incentives. Regarding R&D policies, subsidies are found
to dampen the innovation efforts; however, under certain market structure conditions,
they also encourage entry to the R&D race. Tax incentives that reduce the variable
R&D costs are shown to have positive effects on innovation.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a dynamic innovation race that is driven by demand under an endoge-
nous market structure. In a dynamic framework, we embed a microfoundation that endog-
enizes the number of incumbents and their revenues by consumer income, and we connect
income per capita and inequality to competing firms’ R&D incentives. Both the driving force
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of and the obstacles to innovation can largely stem from market demand. As Schumpeter
stated, “[profit] is the premium which capitalism attaches to innovation” [15]. Consumers’
disposable income and purchasing power construct the market that entrepreneurs face. For
example, in information technology, gauging market preferences is critical for determin-
ing the success of a new gadget; in areas of health care and renewable energy, significant
breakthroughs depend heavily on market needs and the affordability of a certain drug or
a clean-energy product. Thus, beyond the inherent merits of inventions, new products can
only be a success when they are competitive in price and promising in generating profits in
the existing market. This reality underscores the role of market structure in incentivizing
innovation; our work is distinguished from the previous literature by introducing market
structure endogeneity into a dynamic R&D race.
We found that the effect of increasing income inequality on innovation is sensitive to the
market structure. The post-innovation rents received by potential innovators are directly
linked to income inequality. Without varying the income per capita, our results indicate
that higher inequality might reduce the innovation rate, as decreasing low income levels trig-
ger a price reduction of all goods in the market. However, if generations of innovations have
narrower quality gaps (i.e., vertically differentiated products are more similar in quality),
the corresponding market structure will not lead to a lower innovation rate when inequality
increases - in this case, demand shifts take place instead of price reduction, and market prof-
itability remains constant. By endogenizing the market structure, we have obtained findings
that contrast with [6], which does not consider the price competition among successfully
innovated firms.
Furthermore, understanding the connection between income and innovation is an impor-
tant precursor to studying the R&D policies. By endogenizing market structure, our work
adds an important dimension to past studies on innovation policies, which generally have
assumed a specific market structure. The dependence of innovation incentives on market
structure could lead to different insights on R&D policies when market segmentation and
profitability vary. We show that R&D subsidies, modeled by reducing the fixed R&D cost, in
fact shift firms’ innovation rates differently under market structures characterized by higher
competition intensity and/or more concentrated income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related studies.
We describe the price competition game and analyze the endogenous market structure in
Section 3. Then we present the innovation race and analyze the firm’s innovation decisions
using computation in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the comparative statics results and our
2
findings on the equilibrium innovation rate under different income shocks and the impact of
regulatory policies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
We characterize the market of generations (qualities) of goods using a vertically differenti-
ated market, based on the static setting introduced by Shaked and Sutton [17]. We relax
the assumption of uniform income distribution in [17] by generalizing the distribution, and
incorporate a taste shock into the model for consumers at each income level. Thus, within
each income segment, consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for product quality
difference. This setting captures an innovative market, where a successful innovator arrives
with the latest generation (highest quality) product and engages in price competition with
the incumbents. The endogenized market structure depends on the income distribution, con-
sumer taste parameters, and firms’ quality gaps. Extending [17], we embed this endogenous
market structure in a dynamic model, which formulates the R&D race in an infinite horizon
framework.
Studies in the industrial organization literature have examined the connection between
market structure and R&D. However, this line of work has primarily focused on a static
model that limits the analysis to a single or finite-period model [11] [12]. Innovation is
inherently a dynamic process. A new product will eventually be challenged and succeeded
by another innovation; the rate of such turnover under economic forces is the interest of this
study. Thus, we contribute to this body of literature by formulating a dynamic study.
Vives [18] focuses on the connection between competition and innovation efforts. The
study reports that the number of firms increases as the entry cost decreases (implying higher
competitive pressure), but R&D efforts per firm decrease [18]. It models an endogenous (ex-
ogenous) market structure based on free (restricted) entry. Our paper offers a different insight
on the relationship between competition and innovation by endogenizing market structure
according to consumer income and preferences. Under our setup, the R&D subsidies do not
immediately lead to an increase in the number of innovating firms. When the number of
innovating firms is not affected, the R&D efforts per firm decrease as well; however, when
the number of firms increases (extensive margin), the higher competitive pressure actually
stimulates the R&D efforts (intensive margin). The latter parallels the “escape-competition
effect” of the inverted-U relationship discussed in [1]. The “escape-competition effect” occurs
when both the extensive margin and the intensive margin exist: the high-type innovators
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are facing new entrants to the R&D race, and thus innovate more intensively.
On innovation policies, Segal and Whinston provide a dynamic model for analyzing an-
titrust policy and innovation [16]. We offer an additional dimension by endogenizing the
market structure. Without assuming a monopolistic market,1 we consider a vertically differ-
entiated market where incumbents’ profits are determined by the price competition. More-
over, several interesting studies have investigated simultaneously the effect of subsidies on
innovative and imitative technologies using growth models [14] [3]. These works consider
horizontally differentiated innovative goods [8] [14] [3], whereas we treat generations of in-
novations as vertically differentiated based on the setting in [17]. The two different perspec-
tives allow for a more in-depth understanding of the role of R&D subsidies. Interestingly,
our framework and past studies all show both positive and negative effects of subsidies on
innovation.
Our work targets a question that is most closely related to that raised by Foellmi and
Zweimuller, which is on the effect of income inequality on innovation and growth [6]. They
find that greater income inequality is beneficial for innovation incentives and growth: The
effect of the higher price that results from greater income inequality dominates the effect of
the larger market size induced by lesser income inequality [6]. Our results contrast sharply
with theirs by showing that greater income inequality either does not affect or lowers the in-
novation rate, depending on the market structure. In Foellmi and Zweimuller’s work, firms
set monopolistic prices, and consumers purchase a continuum of the differentiated goods
subject to a budget constraint [6]; in the absence of price competition, inequality increases
immediate post-innovation rents while reducing later revenues as innovators are displaced
by newer entrants. Due to discounting, [6] found that inequality increases innovation incen-
tives. Our model assumes substitute goods; thus, each consumer purchases from only one
firm based on the equilibrium prices. We characterize heterogeneous consumer taste2 and
price competition; for instance, a rich consumer will prefer the lower quality product if the
price premium of the higher quality product does not justify this consumer’s taste for the
quality difference. Firms’ market shares of each income segment are then determined en-
dogenously by consumer income and taste heterogeneity. Therefore, when income becomes
more concentrated, a low-quality firm reduces its price to sustain its low-income demand,
1 [16] assumes that a successful innovator enters the market, receives an entrant’s profit in the first period,
and then becomes the monopolist if another innovation enters the market.
2Taste heterogeneity is inherent in consumers’ preferences for varying qualities of products. Taking clean
energy as an example, not all rich consumers have a higher valuation for the innovative solar panel; their
idiosyncrasies, in this case environmentalism, are reflected in the taste shocks given in our model. Other
examples are ubiquitous in technological industries.
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which may lead to a price reduction on the high-quality goods as well because of price com-
petition. In other words, the taste heterogeneity intensifies the price competition and thus
lead to new implications about income inequality and innovation.
The settings in Foellmi and Zweimuller and in our work characterize industries where
innovative products apply different competitive pressures on the incumbent products because
of their substitutability. By noting the opposite effect in the substitute goods case, our
findings compliment Foellmi and Zweimuller’s work, as a mixture of both cases often applies
in practice.
Regarding R&D subsidies, the empirical literature has shown inconsistent findings on how
subsidies stimulate R&D activities [7]. Our results suggest market structure to be a potential
factor influencing such variations. Our findings on the positive effects of tax incentives on
innovation are supported by past empirical evidence [5] [9] [2].
3 Price Competition and Market Structure
In our dynamic problem, each discrete period has the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). In each pe-
riod, there exist two groups of firms differing in their objectives and actions. The incumbent
firms compete on price in the product market, into which the innovations are introduced as
the latest generation or the highest quality good; the potential entrants are the firms making
innovation decisions in the R&D race. This section presents the model setup for the price
competition in each period and analyze firms’ pricing strategies and market segmentation
based on consumers’ preferences. In Section 4, we will analyze the firm’s innovation deci-
sions in the infinite horizon: The innovators, prior to successfully innovating and entering the
product market, choose whether to enter the R&D race and, if so, determine the equilibrium
level of innovation effort.
In Section 5, we solve for the stationary Markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic pro-
gramming problem using computational methods. Assuming firms do not collude, the pricing
strategies in the analysis here are part of the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the
dynamic game.
3.1 Consumers
The setup here extends Shaked and Sutton [17] by generalizing the consumer income dis-
tribution. Consumers are heterogeneous in their income levels and tastes for the product.
Denote a consumer’s income by I ∈ {IH , IL}, such that IL < IH , and 4 = IH − IL; let
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piL ∈ [0, 1] and piH ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of low- and high-income segments respectively.
piH + piL = 1. Define income per capita I = IHpiH + ILpiL, and the relative high-income ratio
qh =
IH
I
. Thus, the triple (I, qh, piH) characterizes the income distribution of the economy.
Furthermore, each consumer experiences a taste shock denoted by the random variable z,
which follows the uniform distribution: z ∼ U [z, z]. For simplicity, a consumer’s taste is
fixed across her life.
In each period, consumers observe firms that produce vertically differentiated, substitute
goods as a result of the innovation race, described in Section 4. Denote k = 1, ..., n as the
index for product quality, where a higher k represents a higher quality.
The consumers are utility maximizing:
max U(I, z, k) = uk ∗ (I + z)
where uk = e
ak following [4] and u0 < u1 < ... < un. Each consumer’s utility is defined
by the utility for consuming a certain quality good weighted by the consumer’s disposable
income and taste. Let Ck be the relative utility difference between products k and k − 1,
and Ck > 1:
Ck =
uk
uk − uk−1 =
ea
ea − 1 = C.
Define zjk as the indifference taste level in the income segment j, so that the consumer
with taste zjk is indifferent between products k and k − 1 at their respective prices. So for
j ∈ {L,H},
U(Ij − pk, zjk, k) = U(Ij − pk−1, zjk, k − 1).
From here, we derive:
zj1 = p1C1 − Ij, (1)
zjk = pk−1(1− Ck) + pkCk − Ij. (2)
Then, consumers within each income segment with taste z > zjk have the preference order
(k, pk)  (k − 1, pk−1).
Proposition 1. The indifference taste levels zjk have the following properties:
1. ∀ k, zjk > zjk−1, for j ∈ {L,H};
2. ∀ k, zHk < zLk ;
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3. ∀ k, zHk + IH = zLk + IL, so zHk +4 = zLk .
3.2 Market Structure Analysis
Both the high- and low-income groups will be partitioned at the indifference taste levels for
market shares of the successive firms in the order of quality. Given two income groups, the
market structure is more elaborate than that in Shaked and Sutton (1982). For example,
there exist possible scenarios in which lower quality firms only cover the low-income segment
while higher quality firms might cover both income segments.
The revenue functions of the competing firms are as follows:
R1(p1, p2, ..., pn) =

p1(z
L
2 − z)piL, (!HL) zH2 ≤ z and zL2 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − z)piH + p1(zL2 − z)piL, (HL) zL1 ≤ z and zH2 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − z)piH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )piL, (HL∗) zH1 ≤ z and zL1 ≥ z;
p1(z
H
2 − zH1 )piH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )piL, (H∗L∗) zH1 ≥ z.
(3)
In the first two cases, the lowest taste consumers in the low-income segment strictly prefer
purchasing the low-quality product over not buying – the low-income market is covered. In
case 1, the lowest quality firm serves only part of the low-income group, whereas in case 2,
it also serves some high-income consumers. In the last two cases, some low-taste consumers
in the low-income segment would not purchase – the low-income market is not covered. In
case 3, the high-income segment is covered, whereas in case 4, the high-income market is not
covered.
When the high-income consumers do not purchase any low-quality goods, those with the
lowest taste for quality would be captured by an intermediate quality level, T , such that
1 < T < n, with revenue,
RT (p1, .., pT , .., pn) = pT (z
H
T+1 − z)piH + pT (zLT+1 − zLT )piL. (4)
For 1 < k < T , firm k competes only for the low-income group; Rk(p1, p2, ..., pn), the
revenue of firm k given the price of its product pk, is,
Rk(p1, .., pk, .., pn) = pk(z
L
k+1 − zLk )piL. (5)
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For T < k < n, firm k may have demand from both income groups:
Rk(p1, .., pk, .., pn) = pk(z
H
k+1 − zHk )piH + pk(zLk+1 − zLk )piL. (6)
And for k = n,
Rn(p1, .., pk, .., pn) = pn(z − zHn )piH + pn(z − zLn )piL. (7)
Lemma 1. Assuming ∆ < z+ IL, the firm producing quality n products serves at least some
of the low-income consumers.
Proof. Suppose firm of quality n does not serve any consumers in the low-income group;
then zLn > z and z
H
n ≥ z. Its revenue function is:
Rn(p1, ..., pn) = pn(z − zHn )piH . (8)
The other firms’ revenue functions are as the revenue functions (3), (4), (5), and (6).
Firm n’s revenue function yields the first-order condition (FOC)
z − 2zLn + ∆− pn−1(Cn − 1)− IL = 0, (9)
which implies z > 2zLn − ∆ + IL. zLn > z then leads to z < ∆ − IL, which is false given
∆ < z + IL. Contradiction.
Note that we do not need to consider the case where zHn < z because, although firm n
does not get any low-income consumers, it will necessarily be better off by lifting zHn . Thus,
the above contradiction shows that the firm producing quality n products gets at least some
low-income consumers.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for revenue functions (5) and (6) are equivalent:
• For 1 < k < n, and k 6= T ,
zLk+1 − zLk − pk[(Ck+1 − 1) + Ck] = 0; (10)
• For k = T ,
zLT+1 − piLzLT − piHz − piH∆− pT [(CT+1 − 1) + piLCT ] = 0; (11)
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• For k = n,
z − zLn + ∆piH − pnCn = 0. (12)
Lemma 2. Let z < min{(2 + 2piL)z + (2piL + 1)IL + piH∆, 4z + 3IL − piH∆}, for any Nash
equilibrium in this vertically differentiated market, at most two firms (producing products of
qualities n and n−1) obtain positive market shares. Furthermore, let z > 2z+2∆−piH∆+IL,
so the firm producing quality n captures some low-income consumers and may share the high-
income segment with the firm producing quality n− 1.
Proof. By applying equation (2), the FOCs (10), (11), and (12) can be rewritten as:
zLk+1 − 2zLk − pk(Ck+1 − 1)− pk−1(Ck − 1)− IL = 0, (13)
zLT+1 − 2piLzLT − piHz − piH∆− pT (CT+1 − 1)− piLpT−1(CT − 1)− piLIL = 0, (14)
z − 2zLn + ∆piH − pn−1(Cn − 1)− IL = 0. (15)
Since Ck > 1 for all k, we get the following conditions:
zLk+1 > 2z
L
k + IL, (16)
zLT+1 > 2piLz
L
T + piHz + piH∆ + piLIL, (17)
z > 2zLn −∆piH + IL. (18)
Conditions (16) and (17) combined with condition (18) yield:
z > 4zLn−1 + 3IL − piH∆, (19)
z > 4piLz
L
n−1 + piH∆ + 2piHz + 2piLIL + IL. (20)
Given the assumption that z < min{(2 + 2piL)z + (2piL + 1)IL + piH∆, 4z + 3IL − piH∆},
we obtain zLn−1 < z. This implies that for any given equilibrium, at most two firms obtain
positive market shares.
Given the assumption that z > 2z + 2∆ − piH∆ + IL (which also trivially leads to
z > piH∆ − IL), inequality (18) implies that zLn < z and is necessary for zHn > z; thus,
the firm producing quality n will get some of the low-income segment and may share the
high-income segment with the successive firm.
Note that ∆ < z+IL ensures that the range 2z+2∆−piH∆+IL < z < min{(2+2piL)z+
(2piL + 1)IL + piH∆, 4z + 3IL − piH∆} is non-empty.
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3.3 Two-Firm Equilibrium
Based on the conditions given by Lemma 2, we analyze the equilibrium prices and profits of
the two vertically differentiated firms in the market. Let firm 1 be the low-quality firm and
firm 2 be the high-quality firm.
Define V ≡ u2−u0
u2−u1 =
C2−1
C1
+ 1. We have:
p1 =
zj1 + Ij
C1
; (21)
p2 =
zj2 + Ij + (z
j
1 + Ij)(V − 1)
C2
. (22)
Firm 1’s revenue functions take the forms of those in Eq. (3), except the case (!HL),
where high-income consumers are not part of firm 1’s demand. When two firms occupy the
market, because firm 2 does not capture the entire high-income segment, both high- and
low-income groups will be shared by the two firms. The remaining three cases yield the
following first-order conditions:
zL2 =

piH∆ + z + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1), (HL)
piH(∆ + z) + z
L
1 piL + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1 + piL), (HL∗)
zL1 + (z
L
1 + IL)V. (H
∗L∗)
(23)
From the highest quality firm’s revenue function, (7), firm 2’s FOC is:
zL2 =
1
2
[
z + piH∆− IL − (zL1 + IL)(V − 1)
]
. (24)
Figure 1 plots firm 1’s FOCs for different ranges of zL1 . Regions I, III, and V in the
figure correspond to the cases of (HL), (HL∗), and (H∗L∗) in firm 1’s revenue functions;
and Regions II and IV are the regions between the adjacent cases. In these regions, in
equilibrium one firm varies its price while the other holds its price constant. Note that from
Eq. (23), firm 1’s FOCs are expressed as functions zL2 (z
L
1 ), which is increasing, whereas from
Eq. (24) firm 2’s FOCs are decreasing functions. The point of intersection is the equilibrium
taste levels zL∗1 and z
L∗
2 , from which equilibrium prices are calculated.
Two firms’ FOC intersect in Region I, if at zL1 = z, firm 2’s z
L
2 lies below that of firm
1. This implies the condition V ≥ z−IL−piH∆−2z
3(z+IL)
+ 1. Similarly, we can derive the boundary
conditions for Regions II through V (see Table 1).
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Figure 1: Firm 1’s First-Order Conditions
Table 1: Boundary Conditions for Regions I, II, III, IV, and V
Region I V ≥ z−IL−piH∆−2z
3(z+IL)
+ 1
Region II z−IL−piH∆−2z
3(z+IL)
+ 1 ≥ V ≥ z−IL−piH∆−2z
3(z+IL)
+ 1− 2piL
3
Region III z−IL−piH∆−2z
3(z+IL)
+ 1− 2piL
3
≥ V ≥ z+piH∆−∆−z
3(z+∆+IL)
+ 2piH
3
Region IV z+piH∆−∆−z
3(z+∆+IL)
+ 2piH
3
≥ V ≥ z+piH∆−∆−z
3(z+∆+IL)
Region V V ≤ z+piH∆−∆−z
3(z+∆+IL)
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Lemma 3. Assume 1.5∆ < z+IL, and let 2z+2∆+IL+piL∆−piH∆ < z < min{(2+2piL)z+
(2piL+1)IL+piH∆, 4z+3IL−piH∆}; there exists a unique equilibrium where exactly two firms
have positive market share. The possible regions where the equilibrium lies include Regions I
and II. Moreover, both low- and high-income markets are covered (i.e., the equilibrium does
not lie in Region III, IV or V).
Proof. Since both firms occupy both income markets, zL2 ≥ z + ∆. From the conditions of
the revenue functions in (3), we see that zL1 is the lowest in case (HL). And Eq. (23) is
increasing in zL1 , while Eq. (24) is decreasing in z
L
2 . Thus, if firm 2’s z
L
2 lies above that of
firm 1 on the left end of case (HL), then a unique equilibrium exists.
By firm 1’s FOCs (23) in case (HL), zL1 =
piL∆
V−1 − IL, at zL2 = z + ∆. That z ≥
2z + 2∆ + IL + piL∆ − piH∆ implies zL2 ≥ z + ∆ in firm 2’s FOC (24) at zL1 = piL∆V−1 − IL.
Therefore, a unique equilibrium exists with the conditions 2z + 2∆ + IL + piL∆ − piH∆ <
z < min{(2 + 2piL)z + (2piL + 1)IL + piH∆, 4z + 3IL − piH∆}.
Suppose z = (2+2piL)z+(2piL+1)IL+piH∆; Region III conditions in Table 1 imply that
V ≤ 1. Given z < min{(2 + 2piL)z+ (2piL + 1)IL +piH∆, 4z+ 3IL−piH∆}, if the equilibrium
were to lie in Region III, then V < 1, which cannot hold because V must be greater than
1. Therefore, the equilibrium only occurs in Region I or II. And in these regions, both high-
and low-income markets are covered.
We now derive the equilibrium prices and revenues for Regions I and II. Only the case
(HL) from firm 1’s revenue functions (3) is relevant at this point. Thus, we have the following
FOCs of the two competing firms:
zL2 = piH∆ + z + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1); (25)
zL2 =
1
2
[
z + piH∆− IL − (zL1 + IL)(V − 1)
]
. (26)
Then we get the equilibrium taste indifference levels:
zL∗1 =
z − 2z − piH∆− IL
3(V − 1) − IL; (27)
zL∗2 =
1
3
[z + z + 2piH∆− IL] . (28)
The equilibrium prices and revenues then follow. They are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Equilibrium Prices and Revenues in Regions I and II
Price Revenue
p∗1 =
z−2z−piH∆−IL
3(C−1) R
∗
1 =
(z−2z−piH∆−IL)2
9(C−1)
Region I p∗2 =
2z−z+piH∆+IL
3C
R∗2 =
(2z−z+piH∆+IL)2
9C
p∗1 =
z+IL
C
R∗1 =
z+IL
2C
[z − piH∆− IL − 2z − (z + IL)(V − 1)]
Region II p∗2 =
z+piH∆+IL+(z+IL)(V−1)
2C
R∗2 =
[z+piH∆+IL+(z+IL)(V−1)]2
4C
4 Innovating Firms
This section describes the innovation race and firms’ innovation decisions. Potential entrants
make decisions in three stages: 1) Entry to the innovation race – firms choose whether to
innovate; 2) Innovation effort – firms choose the level of R&D, which affects their probability
of successful innovation and hence the probability of market entry; 3) In case of market entry,
firms choose their prices, which are described in the equilibrium results in the previous section
(see Table 2). Our setup follows the framework developed by Segal and Whinston [16] with
the extension of heterogeneity of innovation costs across firms.
There exist M firms that are potential entrants. Every period, they pick up a draw 
from a distribution F (·). This draw affects the cost of innovation, which is c(φi()). Assume
the cost function c(·) is convex. φi() ∈ (0, 1) is the innovation rate of firm i with the draw
, and also firm i’s probability of creating a new product.
Assuming  ∈ {l, h} follows the Bernoulli distribution,3 the probability of obtaining the
draw h is η, l < h . For simplicity, let the number of firms obtaining the draw l in each
period be M l (by the Law of Large Numbers M l ≈ (1− η)M).
Multiple innovators may succeed in developing new products. However, only one of these
innovations is granted a patent. The firm with a patent then enters the product market
and becomes an incumbent producing the highest quality product. We use the simultaneous
3The firms with draw l are essentially the high-type firms with low variable R&D cost; and firms with
draw h are the low-type firms. To avoid confusion, instead of using terms of high and low types, we refer
to them as low-cost and high-cost firms, respectively.
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entry and exit setup; thus, the lowest quality incumbent is pushed out of the market when
a new firm enters. The innovation model connects to the market structure analysis at this
point, as the post-innovation rents are characterized by the equilibrium market structure
(see Table 2).
Let pi(φI−) denote the probability of at least one firm successfully creating a new product,
where φI− ∈ [0, 1]N describes the innovation efforts of all potential entrants. Because in each
period only one of these firms is granted a patent and enters the market, the probability of
actually obtaining the patent is denoted by λ(φ, φ−), where φ− ∈ [0, 1]N−1 is the innovation
efforts of the rest of the innovators. In a symmetric equilibrium, firms with the same draw
will make the same decision. Thus, we only consider whether both low- and high-cost firms
choose to innovate. Both pi(φI−) and λ(φ, φ−) have different formulations when either all the
firms innovate or only one type of firms innovate. Thus, we analyze these formulations case
by case.
If all firms innovate, the probability of at least one firm successfully creating a new prod-
uct among M potential entrants with M l low-cost innovating firms is denoted by piM,M l(φ
I
−),
where:
piM,M l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1− φ(h))M−M
l
(1− φ(l))Ml ]. (29)
Among M potential entrants with M l low-cost innovating firms, conditional on successful
innovation, the probability of obtaining a patent for any one firm is denoted by ri
M,M l
(φ−),
where i ∈ {h, l}:
rhM,M l(φ−)
=
M−M l−1∑
x=0
M l∑
y=0
[(
M −M l − 1
x
)(
M l
y
)
φ(h)
x(1− φh)M−M l−1−xφ(l)y(1− φ(l))M l−y
x+ y + 1
]
,
rlM,M l(φ−)
=
M−M l∑
x=0
M l−1∑
y=0
[(
M −M l
x
)(
M l − 1
y
)
φ(h)
x(1− φh)M−M l−xφ(l)y(1− φ(l))M l−1−y
x+ y + 1
]
.
The probability of obtaining a patent for this firm with high or low cost among M potential
entrants with M l low-cost innovating firms is, respectively, then λi
M,M l
(φ(i), φ−), where
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i ∈ {h, l}:
λhM,M l(φ(h), φ−) = φ(h)r
h
M,M l(φ−),
λlM,M l(φ(l), φ−) = φ(l)r
l
M,M l(φ−).
If only low-cost firms innovate, the probability of at least one firm successfully creating
a new product is:
piM l,M l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1− φ(l))M
l
]. (30)
The conditional probability for a given firm is:
rl
M l,M l
(φ−) =
M l−1∑
k=0
[
1
k + 1
(
M l − 1
k
)
φ(l)
k(1− φ(l))M l−1−k
]
.
And based on the above equations, the probability of a (low-cost) firm’s obtaining a
patent is:
λlM l,M l(φ(l), φ−) = φ(l)r
l
M l,M l(φ−). (31)
Following [16] we use the dynamic programming approach to formulate this problem and
look for the stationary Markov perfect equilibria. The value functions of the innovating firms
are listed below:4
V 0(, φ−) = max{0,−f + V E(, φ−)}; (32)
V E(, φ−) = maxφ{λ(φ, φ−)V IJ + (1− λ(φ, φ−))βEV 0(′, φ′−)− c(φ)}; (33)
V Ii (, φ−) = Ri + βpi(φ
I
−)V
I
i−1(, φ−) + β(1− pi(φI−))V Ii (, φ−), (34)
i = 2, ..., J ;
V I1 (, φ−) = R1 + βpi(φ
I
−)EV
0(′, φ′−) + β(1− pi(φI−))V I1 (, φ−). (35)
V 0(, φ−) is the value function of potential entrants at the start of each stage game;
V E(, φ−) is the value function of entrants in the R&D race; and V Ii (, φ−) and V
I
1 (, φ−) are
the value functions for incumbents producing product quality i and the lowest quality product
before exiting, respectively. We show that the dynamic programming problem described by
Eq. (32) through (35) satisfies the Blackwell sufficient conditions; thus, it has a unique fixed
point in a bounded space.
4Since draws of high and low costs are taken in each period, the draw of the next period is denoted with
an apostrophe (′).
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Lemma 4. The dynamic programming problem characterized by Eq. (32) through (35) has
a unique fixed point.
Proof. We need to show that the problem defined by Eq. (32) through (35) satisfies Blackwell
sufficient conditions. Define the operator T as follows:
Tv0(, φ−) = max{0,−f + V E(, φ−)}, and
V E(, φ−) = maxφg(φ, , φ−) + β˜(φ)Ev0(′, φ′−),
where g(φ, , φ−) = λ1−β(1−pi)R2 +
βλpi
(1−β(1−pi))2R1− φ2−f . β˜(φ) =
(
λ(βpi)2
(1−β(1−pi))2 + 1− λ
)
. Here
λ stands for λ(φ, φ−). pi represents pi(φ−).
1) Monotonicity. Let x1(, φ−) and x2(, φ−) be two bounded functions. x1(, φ−) ≤
x2(, φ−) for all (, φ−). Let φ∗ be the optimal solution for the second term in equation
(32) given x1. V
E(∗, φ− : x1) ≤ V E(∗, φ− : x2). Let φ∗∗ be the optimal value for the
optimization problem of V E(, φ−) given x2. Then V E(∗, φ− : x2) ≤ V E(∗∗, φ− : x2). Thus,
Tx1(, φ−) ≤ Tx2(, φ−), and the monotonicity condition is satisfied.
2) Discounting. T (v+a)(, φ−) = max{0,−f+maxφ (g(φ, , φ−)+β˜(φ)(Ev(′, φ′−)+a))}.
Obviously β˜(φ) < 1. Then T (v + a)(, φ−) ≤ max{β¯a,−f + maxφ (g(φ, , φ−) + β˜(φ)a +
β¯Ev(′, φ′−))} = Tv(, φ−) + β˜(φ)a.
In a symmetric equilibrium of interest, the firms with the same shocks have the same
innovation rate. Obviously, the firms do not innovate if they are not in the market. A
potential entrant observes its competitors’ action and its type, then decides whether to enter
the R&D race, and identifies its optimal R&D efforts. In equilibrium, its decision should be
the same as that of other firms with the same shocks.
Because of the complexity of the dynamic problem, we use computation methods to find
the numerical solutions to the problem described by Eq. (32) through (35). In particular,
given φ−(), we solve this problem using the value function iteration method and derive the
policy function φ(, φ−()). We then evaluate the distance between the derived innovation
rate φ(, φ−()) and the original guess and update the φ−() to find the solutions of these
equations.5 We also try a large set of initial guesses to check whether there may exist multiple
equilibria. Our computation results are robust under different initial guesses.
5We use the “fsolve′′ function in Matlab to solve this system of equations.
16
5 Equilibrium Results and Comparative Statics
In this section, we turn to the discussion of our key results regarding the effect of income per
capita and income inequality on firms’ equilibrium innovation rate. We analyze the change
in innovation rates of firms with different shocks, as well as the aggregate innovation level.
We then illustrate the implications of public policies, such as R&D tax credits and subsidies,
using numerical examples.
5.1 Parameterization
The aim of our analysis is to provide insight into the qualitative properties of the equilibrium
innovation rate under the effect of income shocks and different types of innovation policies.
Although some parameters are chosen from standard values and previous literature, they are
not based on data from specific industries.
The discount rate β = 0.95 implies the annual interest rate is approximately 5 percent. a
in the utility function is 1.4. The income per capita I is 0.75. We divide the whole population
into two classes: Rich and Poor, each of which has half of the whole population. The relative
high income qh is set to 1.33. We assume half of consumers have high income. The upper
bound of the taste shock z is 4.2, while the lower bound z is 1.2. The sunk cost of innovation
f is set to 0.1. As for the functional form of innovation cost c(·), we follow Aghion et al.’s
model and use quadratic form, c() = φ2 [1]. Firms with high variable costs for innovation
have h = 20. Firms with low variable costs for innovation have l = 10. We also assume the
number of potential entrants is 10 each period and the number of firms with high innovation
costs is 5. We set these numbers relatively low to reduce the computation load.
With the above parameterizations, both types of firms conduct innovation. The inno-
vation rate for the firms with high innovation costs is 9.33 percent. The innovation effort
of the rest of firms is higher, 19.48 percent, as their innovation costs are lower. And the
equilibrium prices fall in Region 2. If we set a = 1.1, then the equilibrium falls into Region
1. The firms with high innovation cost have an innovation effort of 8.6 percent. The firms
with low innovation cost have an innovation rate of 17.91 percent.
The parameter a characterizes a consumer’s valuation for quality. When a is greater, a
consumer’s utility towards a higher quality of good is higher. Thus, the reward of being a
technology leader is greater,6 and the potential entrants have higher incentive to innovate.
6Our analysis focuses on the “relative” quality, as the gap between technology leader and follower is
constant across time and the valuation of consumer is also constant.
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The aggregate innovation in Region 2 is higher than that in Region 1. In the following
exercises, we discuss firms’ innovation behaviors in different regions separately. Most of the
parameters follow the baseline parameterizations, and we study only one kind of shock in
each exercise.
5.2 Innovation and Income Distribution
In this section, we investigate the effect that varying the distribution of consumer incomes
has on firms’ innovation decisions. As mentioned before, the consumer’s income in this
economy is characterized by three quantities: income per capita I, relative high income level
qh =
IH
I
, and the fraction of rich people piH . We focus on the effects of varying income per
capita I and varying income inequality qh.
7
Varying income inequality to examine the innovation rate yielded an important insight:
The price competition among the incumbents is critical when examining the effect of income
inequality on the innovation rate. We have found that increasing inequality does not en-
courage innovation. When income levels become more polarized, a decreasing low-income
level triggers overall price reduction due to price competition. Thus, the post-innovation
rents are diminished, which discourages innovation. We also incorporate taste heterogeneity
among consumers, which relaxes the assumption in the past literature [17] [6] that high-
income consumers always prefer the higher quality good. A consumer’s willingness to pay
for a higher quality good based on her income is moderated by her taste toward a higher
quality good; some wealthy consumers may purchase a lower quality good, while some poor
consumers (with strong taste for higher quality) may purchase the higher quality good. This
formulation allows for market segmentation within a group of consumers of the same income
level. As a result, price competition propagates through all firms in the market as income
inequality sharpens.
Another important finding is that the effect of income inequality on innovation is sensitive
to market structure, which highlights the feature of endogenous market structure in our
framework. We found that the equilibrium innovation rate reacts differently to varying
inequality under two equilibrium regions obtained in our microfoundation. In Region 2,
income inequality has an adverse effect on innovation, as discussed, whereas in Region 1,
the innovation rate stays constant. The parameter value a is crucial in determining the
equilibrium regions: When quality gaps of the incumbents are small, and/or the income
7Generally, Gini coefficient is used to measure the degree of equality in an economy. In our setup, the
Gini coefficient is 12 (1− (1− piH)fl − (fl + 1)piH), where fl = I − qhpiH . In our analysis, we fix piH and vary
qh to study the effect of varying income inequality.
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Figure 2: Innovation and Income Inequality – Region 1
Figure 3: Innovation and Income Inequality – Region 2
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Figure 4: Aggregate Innovation and Income Inequality –
Region 2
inequality is low, the results fall under Region 1; when the quality gaps widen, and/or income
inequality becomes high, Region 2 takes over. In the former case, increasing inequality causes
equal shifting of market demand from the low-income (high-income) segment to the high-
income (low-income) segment for the higher-quality (lower-quality) firm, without any price
change; therefore, all firms’ profits stay the same,8 which does not disturb the innovation
rate (see Figure 2). In the latter case, wide quality gaps allow the low-quality firm to set the
price only low enough to cover the low-income market. Increased inequality further brings
down the low-income level and, in turn, pushes down the low-quality firm’s equilibrium price.
Because of the price competition, all firms’ equilibrium prices are lowered. The expected
value of a potential innovator is then reduced because of price undercutting; thus, innovation
is discouraged (see Figure 3).
Our results shed light on evaluating the effect of rising income inequality on aggregate
innovation. It is well-known that income inequality rose rapidly after World War II. The
Gini coefficient, the common measure of income inequality, increased about 16 percent from
1947 to 2008. The rising income inequality changes consumers’ demand and thus the firms’
incentives to innovate, as the analysis shows. In particular, our analysis shows that the
impact of rising inequality may vary in different industries, as the consumers may have
different valuations for qualities of goods.
For income per capita, the equilibrium innovation rates are increasing in both regions,
and the increase is more pronounced in Region 2 (see Figures 5 and 6). Intuitively, higher
8Recall that income per capita is held constant here.
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Figure 5: Innovation and Income per Capita – Region 1
Figure 6: Innovation and Income per Capita – Region 2
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income per capita elevates consumers’ purchasing power, which generates higher profits for
firms and increases post-innovation rents of the innovators. This result is consistent with
the procyclicality of R&D in the empirical studies. Again, our results indicate that market
structure plays a role in the magnitude of the effect.
5.3 Innovation and Policy
To understand innovation policies, we examined those that regulate different R&D costs. In
our model, the innovators incur both variable and fixed costs for conducting R&D. They
are heterogeneous in their variable costs determined by a shock in each period. The fixed
costs are associated with the upfront overhead expenditures, such as setting up or upgrading
research facilities, whereas the variable costs depend on the intensity of the R&D efforts.
The number of projects under way, size of the R&D group, degrees of internal and external
collaboration, and so on all contribute to the variable innovation costs. The high-type
innovators have a lower variable R&D cost and incur lower expenses for the same innovation
level as that of the low-type innovators, who have a higher variable cost.
To illustrate the utilization of subsidies, we lower innovators’ fixed R&D cost, as subsidies
provide assistance for overcoming the barriers of conducting R&D and shift up the total firm
value [10] [13]. We found that subsidies that directly lower the fixed R&D cost may have a
negative effect under certain market structures (Region 2, see Figure 9); under a different
market structure, subsidies may have mixed effects, yet still do not continuously stimulate
innovation (Region 1, see Figure 7). By alleviating the R&D barrier, subsidies also undermine
innovating firms’ incentives to exert greater innovation efforts because expected revenues
shift upward; thus, firms become “lazier.” However, as subsidies mitigate the intensity of
innovation competition in such fashion, they also encourage entry to the R&D race, thus
improving the aggregate innovation rate. This effect is marked by the jumps in Figure 7. It
shows that as the equilibrium innovation rate reduces to a certain level, high-cost innovators
perceive a reasonable chance of success and enter the race. At this point the aggregate
innovation rate has an upward shift because of a higher number of active innovators and
increased R&D competition (see Figure 8). Therefore, subsidies have the effect of lowering
the barrier to the R&D race but do not act as a short-term stimulus.
Our results also yield insights on the relationship between innovation and competitive
pressure. As R&D subsidies lower the fixed cost, the increase in competition leads to a surge
in the aggregate innovation because both the extensive margin and the intensive margin occur
simultaneously as shown in Figure 7 and 8. The extensive margin is reflected in the entry
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Figure 7: Innovation and Fixed Costs – Region 1
Figure 8: Aggregate Innovation and Fixed Costs – Region
1
Figure 9: Innovation and Fixed Costs – Region 2
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Figure 10: Innovation and Variable Costs – Region 1
Figure 11: Innovation for Variable Costs – Region 2
of high-cost innovators into the R&D race, whereas the intensive margin is characterized by
an upward jump in the innovation rate of both types of innovators. However, in the absence
of the extensive margin, the innovation rate decreases (see Figure 9). The extensive margin
illustrated is consistent with Vives’s work [18], while the intensive margin that takes place
simultaneously results from the “escape-competition effect” explained by Aghion et al. in
the context of the inverted-U relationship [1].
In the analysis of tax incentives, we apply tax credits as a reduction of the variable
R&D costs–across various countries similar fiscal incentives exist to stimulate dollars spent
on innovation.9 We found that reducing variable R&D costs has a generally favorable effect
and encourages all types of innovators to exert higher effort.
As Figure 10 shows, as the variable cost decreases, both the value and innovation rate
9Hall and Reenen (2000) provides an extensive overview of the tax treatment of R&D in different na-
tions [9].
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increase for both types of firms. Similar to the previous observations with income per capita,
the effect is pronounced in Region 2 (see Figure 11). And we see that reducing variable
R&D costs improves the aggregate innovation.10 These policies also increase firms’ values in
equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the effect of income on competing firms’ innovation rate using a framework
that combines endogenous market structure and the dynamic model with heterogeneous
innovators. This model adds significant richness to the past literature by incorporating the
competition of market incumbents, as well as the infinite horizon of the dynamic R&D race.
We found that while increasing income per capita affects innovation positively, high
income inequality may reduce the innovation rate, which contradicts past findings [6]. Fur-
thermore, by endogenizing market structure, we discovered that the change in the innovation
rate resulting from income depends on the equilibrium market structure. Similarly, the way
an R&D policy shapes innovation may also be conditional on the market structure, according
to our results on R&D subsidies and tax credits. Therefore, our work offers an important
contribution by identifying this important link between the endogeneity of market structure
and the analysis of firms’ innovation incentives and R&D policies. This work emphasizes the
sensitivity of policy impact during turbulent business cycles and calls for extensive future
work on R&D policies that take into account related factors.
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